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In recent literature, a very popular position about the normativity of
assertion claims that standards for epistemically proper assertion vary
withpractical context,while standards forknowledgedonot.Thispaper
showsthisclaimisstronglyincompatiblewiththereceivedvaluetheoretic
view regarding the relationship between the axiological and the deontic:
oneofthetwohastogo.
1.Introduction
Here is a thesis that has made a nice career for itself in recent
epistemologicalliterature:
Assertion Sensitivism (SA): The degree of warrant necessary for
epistemically1 proper assertion varieswith contextual features,while the
degreeofwarrantnecessaryforknowledgestaysfixed.
1 Crucially,theresultsofthispaperonlyconcernSAinitsepistemicincarnation.




This paper argues that, surprisingly enough, in spite of the wide
spreadsupport theyenjoy, the twoclaimsaboveare incompatible.Todo
this,Ifirstlookatthedatathatare takentomotivateSA(#2).Furtheron,I
spelloutwhattheSAclaimamountstowhentakeninconjunctionwithAC.




Standards for proper assertablility definitely seem to varywith practical
context.Consider,forillustration,thefollowingpairofcases:
ASPIRIN1. You remember having bought aspirin last month. As such,




two years old baby is having a fever, and needs an aspirin as soon as




3It looks as though, in high stakes practical contexts, assertability
does not come cheap: intuitively,morewarrant is required inASPIRIN2,
but not in ASPIRIN1, for being in a position to properly assert that you
haveaspirinathome.LetusdubthistheShiftinessIntuition.2
Now, this phenomenon is hardly a newly arrived guest at the
epistemology table; however, popularity wise, the golden age of the
Shiftiness Intuition began once being employed to defend contextualism
aboutknowledgeattributions(e.g.DeRose2002)oronevarietyoranother
of pragmatic encroachment for knowledge (e.g. Hawthorne 2004); let us
dub both these views knowledge sensitivism (SK for short).Roughly, the
thought goes as follows: very plausibly, knowledge is the norm of
epistemicallyproperassertion;thatis, oneisinagoodenoughpositionto
makeanepistemicallyproperassertionthatpifandonlyifoneknowsthat
p (KNA).3 If that is the case, however, it follows that the standards for
knowledge go hand in hand with the standards for proper assertability.
Giventhatthelatterseemtovarywithcontext,sowilltheformer.
For people who like classical invariantism (CI) about knowledge
attribution,however, the jump fromvariation inassertabilitywithstakes
to contextualism or pragmatic encroachment seemed rushed. As such,
these authors venture to account for the Shiftiness Intuition under a
classical invariantistumbrellabyarguingforcontextsensitivityofproper
assertability.
The thought behind the view is, roughly, to explain the intuitive
variabilityinproprietyfromoneASPIRINcasetotheotherbykeepingthe
standardsforknowledgefixed,andallowingthatthedegreeofwarrantfor





4warrant may be needed in others.4 This view has become known in the
literature as a Warranted Assertability Maneuver (WAM) 5 against
knowledgesensitivism.
In this respect, thus, according to SA, although the speakers
epistemic status remains unchanged in the two ASPIRIN cases, the
assertion I have aspirin at home would not be epistemically proper in
ASPIRIN2due to change in the relevant contextual features,6most likely
relatedtotherelevantstakes.Thatis,whilethespeakerdoesknowthathe
hasaspirinathome inbothASPIRIN1andASPIRIN2,due tochanges in




forassertionoutthereinthefirstplace, it is likelytheretomakeit likely
thatassertiondeliverstheepistemicgoodsweareusingitfor.Andhereis
a fairly innocentvaluetheoreticclaimtocapture this thought: it looksas
4 SAalsocomesinmorethanonevariety;firsttherearepeoplethinkingthatassertionis
governed by one norm which stipulates that the appropriate amount of warrant for
proper assertion varies with contextual features (e.g. Brown (2010), Gerken (2012),
Goldberg (2015) MCKinnon (2013), Rescorla (2009)). Another way to be a sensitivist
about assertion is to stipulate several norms governing assertion, depending on the
context (e.g. Greenough (2011), Levin (2008), Stone (2007)). The subtle differences
betweentheaboveviewsare,however,toalargeextent, irrelevantfornow(butseethe




5 Strictlyspeaking, thereare twowaysonecanpullaWAM:onecanplace thesourceof
contextsensitivityattheleveloftheepistemicnormitself(SA),or,tothecontrary,defend
a fixed norm and argue that pragmatic, Gricean considerations influence propriety in
context (e.g. Rysview 2001). This paper is only concerned with the first incarnation
thereof.
6 It is fair to say that defenders of SA goon separateways when it comes to listing the
relevantcontextualdeterminers;thatis,forsomeofthem,practicalconcernsfigurehigher
on the list (e.g. Gerken 2012),6while others (e.g. Goldberg 2015) focus more on non
practicalcontextsensitivity.
5though anormspertainingtoonetypeor anotherhastodowiththetype
of goods it is associatedwith. Thus, prudential normswill be associated
withprudentialgoods,moralnormswillbeassociatedwithmoralgoods,
etc.Epistemicnormswill thuscometogetherwithepistemicgoods.Peter
Graham puts the point succinctly: Epistemicnorms in this sense govern
whatweoughttosay,doorthinkfromanepistemicpointofview,fromthe
pointofviewofpromotingtruebeliefandavoidingerror(Graham2012).






same typedoesnot implyanysubstantialvaluetheoreticcommitment; it
holds on both the most notable views regarding the relationship of the
good to the deontic.7 The teleologist explains the ought in terms of the
good;accordingtothisphilosopher, thefollowingistrue:
ACTeleology:Normof typeXare there toguideus in reachinggoods of
typeX.
The deontologist reverses the order of explanation: according to
FittingAttitudeaccountsofvalue,
7 Forsupportof AC:foragoodgeneraloverviewoftherelevantliteratureinvaluetheory,
see, for instance, Schroeder (2012); for champions of the teleological direction of
explanation, see e.g.Moore (1903), Portmore (2005). Sidwick (1907) and Slote (1989).
For the deontological direction, see e.g. Scanlon (1998) Ewing (1947), Rabinowicz and
RönnowRasmussen(2004)).




assertion and at how it fares in conjunction with the Association Claim.
First, what we are talking about is the epistemic norm of assertion. The
question, then, becomes: what is the relevant epistemic good? Many
authors (e.g. David (2005)) regard truth as the fundamental epistemic
good.Themostprominentcountercandidateintheliteratureisknowledge
(Williamson (2000)). Forourpurposeshere, in order to stayon the safe
side,wewill test theplausibilitySAforbothcandidategoods.8 Note,also,
thattheepistemicinterestatstakecanbethoughttobebothatthespeaker
andatthehearersend.Assuch,wewillhavetolookonbothsides.
Letus startwith teleologicalorderofexplanation.ByAC, then,SA
proponentswillalsobecommittedto:









on the assumption of an epistemic goal that itself varies with practical stakes, such as
providingactionableinformation.
7But surely SA proponents would not want to stand behind this
formulation, since it is blatantly false: pragmatic factorsdonot influence
truthconduciveness.Furthermore, Idoubt that (manyof) the supporters
of SA themselves, given the classical invariantistmotivations behind the
view,wouldwant to stand behind such formulation. Here is Gerken, for
one: epistemic warrant is determined by traditional truthrelated
factorsandnotbypragmaticfactors (Gerken2012,377).
In the light of all this,maybewe should justmove on;maybe the
real problem is the truth goal. Let us turn to knowledge9 as the main
epistemic good, then, plug it into the SAConsequentialism and seewhat
happenstotheframework:
SATeleologyknowledge One should proportion the degree of warrant
supporting ones assertion to contextual features to the aim ofmaking a
knowledgeableassertion/generatingknowledgeinoneshearer.






While on the hearers side a similar resultmight be less obvious,
notice thatwhat theclaimamounts to, asa factof thematter, is that the
hearerneedsanepistemicallybettersource inhighstakesscenariosthan
in low stakes ones in order to gain knowledge. Surely, given the strict
invariantistmotivationsbehindSA, this isanunacceptableresult, since it
dissolvestheview,initsoriginalformulation,bycollapsingitintoSK;what






teleological valuetheoretic framework. On one hand, this is rather
unfortunate;afterall,ideally,onedoesnotwantonespreferredaccountof
the normativity of assertion to commit one to very substantive value
theoretic claims. On the other hand, given the dubious name
consequentialismhasmadeforitselfonindependentgrounds,maybethis
shouldnotworrytheSAchampiontoomuch,however.Letuschangethe




It is abitmysterious, however, in virtueofwhat exactlydoes SAgiveus










stakes; as such, it gives us no particular reason to favour classical
invariantist knowledge over other epistemic standings characterized by
less, respectivelymorewarrant. If, however,knowledge itself is sensitive
9topracticalcontext,asSKwouldhaveit,theSAnormisabletoprovideus
withreasontofavourit.
To sum up, then: if the (valuetheoretically innocent) Association
Claimbetweennormsandgoods ofaparticular typeholds,SAcomesout
untenable for themain candidates for the central epistemic good in the
literature. On both availableAC directions of explanation, in a truthgoal
framework, its claims turn out false, or, at least, highly implausible. In a
knowledgegoal framework, thepositioncollapses intocontextsensitivity
ofknowledge,whichwaswhatitsproponentswerereactingagainstinthe
firstplace.
What SA seems to need is a complementary pluralistic account
regarding the epistemic goal, tightly connected to contextual practical
determiners. That is, roughly, a view onwhich the epistemic goal varies
withpracticalstakes,suchas:thegoalofassertionisprovidingactionable
information.10 On such a view, variation in warrant for proper assertion
wouldjusttrackthevariationinepistemicgoal,which,inturn,wouldtrack
thevariationinepistemicneedsgiventhepracticalcontext.
Now, tomy knowledge, this view is still in need of defence in its
ownright; thus,asthingsstand,itcanhardlybeemployedtothesupport






epistemicgoal ingeneralmightgetSA into troublewhen it comes to the
normativity of belief; that is, if some variety of (the very popular) norm





and therefore the epistemic norm  of belief also varies with practical
factors.Toseewhythisisthecase,notethatmany(ifnotmost)people11 in








toavoidthisresult: 12 either (1) restricttheviewtoassertionanddenythe
commonality assumption (and therefore either the normative import of
the extremely widely endorsed belief/assertion parallel, or the parallel
itself) (which, I take it, is a fairly serious theoretical cost, or in need of
independent support). (2) Hold that epistemically permissible assertion
goes hand in hand with practically permissible belief, not with
epistemicallypermissiblebelief;Theproblemwithboth(1)and(2) isthat
they will allow for intuitively strange situations whereby a speakers
assertion that p will count as epistemically permissible (in virtue of its
degreeofwarrantbeinggoodenough forhearerspracticallypermissible
belief), although they do not believe that p themselves, in virtue of not
having enoughwarranttoepistemicallypermissiblybelievethatp.
(3) Deny that the status at stake in DTB is knowledgelevel
justification, rather than some practically sensitive variety of epistemic
justificationforbelief.Thisisanepistemicallynormativepluralisticpicture
for belief: a belief might be epistemically justified even if it is not a




knowledge. The standards of epistemic justification/permissibility for
beliefmightthereforebecontextsensitive,eventhoughthestandardsfor
knowledge level justification/permissibility are not contextsensitive. The
formertrackactionability,thelatterdonot.Afewthingsaboutthis.First,
while I grant that this picture occupies a position in the logical space, I
want to strongly emphasize that it is not defended anywhere in the
literature, and hardly a straightforward, theoretically neutral way to go.
Therefore, I take it, it requires very seriousdefence in order tobe taken
seriously.Herearea fewreasons for this:First,because itneeds todeny
thewidelyacceptedDTB.Second,becauseitneedstostipulatenormative
pluralismwhere all the competing views do not  so it scoresworse on
simplicity grounds. Third, because on this view, one can have a
knowledgeable belief that one should, epistemically, not hold which is
rathercounterintuitive. Fourth,mostcrucially,thedefenderofsuchan
accountwillwant to avoid the following results: on her view, given that
epistemic permissibility of belief varieswith practical stakes, believing a
falsehood, or something one has no justification whatsoever for, when
nothing hinges on it, or in return for one million dollars would be
epistemically perfectly fine. That seems like quite a theoretical cost. In a




One canmaybe try to address this problem by setting a minimal
thresholdfor(epistemically)permissibleassertion/belief.13 Onewaytodo
this in a nonadhoc manner would be by arguing for some pragmatic
considerations infavouroftherelevantthreshold.Forinstance,onecould
think that something like the maxim of Relevance would recommend




with.14 Or, alternatively, one could think that, in virtue of the maxim of
Quality,assertingthatpcarriesthe implicaturethatthere issomereason
tobelievethatp.Assuch,onthisview,innostakescases,whileasserting
in theabsenceofanywarrant isstrictlyspeakingepistemicallyproper in
virtue of it being practically proper, it comes across as intuitively
inappropriate due to considerations pertaining to the pragmatics of
language.
Alas,though,thismovewillnotgetthechampionofthevariantgoal
view too far either. After all, one can easily imagine cases where the
amountofwarrantisproblematicallyraisedratherthanlowered.Take,for
instance,acasewhere Iamofferedone milliondollars towithholdbelief
unless I am certain (as in Cartesian certainty) that p. In this case, the
defenderofthevariantgoalviewwillhavetosaythat,ifIseethatthereisa
tableinfrontofme,andtherefore Ibelievethattheresatable infrontof
me, my belief is epistemically impermissible. Again, this does not sound
right.
What the defender of this account seems to be in need of, then,
wouldbeaprincipledwaytoseparatethegoodprudentialconsiderations
from the bad ones; I submit that there is reason to believe there is no
easy,nonquestionbegging answerforthisprobleminsight.
4.ObjectionsandReplies
Onereply thatmightcome fromtheSAcamp, though,couldgoalong the
followinglines:theSAchampioncouldarguethatthevariabilityinwarrant





back her assertion. In this case, being in possession of an amount of
warrantappropriatetothesituationwouldputthespeakerinapositionto
beable tomeet thisdemand,and thus successfullygenerate the relevant
beliefinherhearer.




Notice, also, that adding the necessary access requirement would
render the view fairly implausible; after all, surely small children can
produceepistemicallyproperassertions,inspiteofthefactthattheydont
have verywell developed reflective capacities. Furthermore,most of our
knowledge is stocked in memory and, for most of it, we do not really
rememberhowwecametoacquireittobeginwith.I, forinstance,surely
donotrememberhowIgottoknowthatBerlinisthecapitalofGermany.
Does that mean I cannot make the relevant assertion? The answer,
accordingtothisenhancedversionofSAwillhavetobeno.
Two options arestillavailabletotheSAdefenderatthispoint:first,
she could make the need for discursive justification contextdependent
also, such as to only encounter the cognitively unsophisticated asserters
problemwhenthestakesarehigh.Thismorerestrictedversionseemsto
enjoy more plausibility. Gerkens view, for instance, explicitly requests
that, in some contexts, but not all, one should be able to back ones
assertionwithappropriatesupport.
Alternatively, she could argue that the need for more warrant in
highstakesthaninlowstakesscenariospertainstohearers notbelieving
what the speaker says unless they not only know the content of their
assertion, but they also know that they know  which, in turn, requires
14
more warrant than mere knowledge.15 This picture, in turn, would have




envisaged SA champions reply: the variability inwarrant is required for
belief generation, not for its truth. In high stakes scenarios, the hearer
might be extremely cautious and ask the speaker to either back her
assertion with the contextually appropriate discursive justification or,
alternatively, to know that they know.Were the speaker not able to do
so/nottohaveknowledgeofknowledge,thehearerwouldnotbelievethe
content of the assertion, and, as such, the aim of generating of true
belief/knowledgewouldbemissed.
Now, note that, for all is said above, we are dealing with a
descriptive,empiricalclaim:thethoughtisthat,asamatteroffact,thereis
a chance that the hearer requests discursive justification/knowledge of
knowledge forbelieving.But,ofcourse,thiscannotbewhatismeanttobe
relevant to thenormative claimofSA;afterall,maybehearersarenot in
theirepistemicrighttodoso, inwhichcasenoobligationforthespeaker
shouldfollow. Justbecausehearersmight,forinstance,requirespeakersto
wear redhats if theywant tobebelieved, itdoesnot follow thatwewill
have a redhatwearingnormofproper assertion thereby, at least surely










What seems to be needed is a normative claim alongside the
empiricalone;foranyobligationtofollowonthespeakersside,itmustbe
thecasethat,ontopof thembeing inthehabit todoso,hearersarealso
epistemically permitted to ask for discursive justification/knowledge of
knowledge.Whatisneeded,then, isanormthatmakestherequirementfor
knowledge of knowledge/discursive justification permissible.
Furthermore, given that we are interested in the epistemic norm of
assertion, the relevant norm on the part of the hearer also needs to be
epistemic,ratherthanprudential ormoral.
In a nutshell, then, what we need is an (importantly) epistemic
norm that makes it permissible for hearers to only believe what the
speaker says if the latter has knowledge of knowledge/ contextually
appropriatediscursive justification.This,however,will easily threaten to
drivetheSAdefenderbackinthetroublehewastryingtoavoidtobegin
with.Hereishow:again,itiswidelyacceptedthatabeliefisepistemically
justified (where what is at stake is the justification required for
knowledge)if andonlyifitisepistemicallypermissible (DTB).16 Therefore,
a stakesvariant epistemic norm of belief will readily result in stakes
variation for knowledge. Of course, one can have a stakesvariant
prudential norm of belief, for instance. However, again, this prudential
normonthepartofthehearerwouldonlybeabletogenerateaprudential
normonthepartofthespeaker;whatwearesearchingfor,though, isthe
distinctively epistemic norm of assertion. The two will, of course, often
come apart: it might be epistemically perfectly fine, for instance, to tell
your boss that hes bald if you know it to be the case, but, prudentially
speaking,itisdefinitelybetterto keep quiet (Brown 2011).
OnelastoptionfortheSAdefenderthatstillneeds tobediscussedis




stakes than in low stakes is because more error possibilities become
salient. Assuch,properassertabilityisonlyindirectlysensitivetopractical
stakes, through its being sensitive to the (genuinely) epistemic need for
dismissing salient error possibilities. Patrick Greenoughs (2011) view
affords this way out. According to Greenough, assertion is governed by





that thisneed is a genuinely epistemicone.Towhat epistemic aim, does
one need to be able to dismiss the relevant error possibilities? One
plausible answer is that the latter constitute themselves in normative




claimagainstKNA, i.e. the claim thanmore thanknowledge is needed in
highstakescontextforproperassertability.Afterall,plausiblyenough,the
samenormative defeaters that forbid the hearer frombelievingwill also
(normatively) act on the speakers epistemic standing. As such, the
defender of KNA can easily help herself to the same explanation of the
Shiftiness Intuitionhere: the reasonwhy thespeakerneeds tobeable to






view concerning the normativity of assertion  what I have dubbed
assertionsensitivism anda fairlyuncontroversial valuetheoretic thesis
concerningtheassociationbetweennormsandvaluesof thesametype. I
have argued that assertion sensitivism, as a thesis about the epistemic
normativityofassertion, isuntenable inconjunctionwith theAssociation
Claim. To show this, I have picked the most popular candidates for the
mainepistemicgoodsintheliterature,andshowedhowSAsclaimseither
turn out false, or collapse the view into knowledge sensitivism, i.e. the
positionchampionsofSAweretryingtoavoidtobeginwith.17
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